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Summary
Contextual effects are ubiquitous in vision and reveal
fundamental principles of sensory coding. Here, we
demonstrate that an oriented surround grating can af-
fect the perceived orientation of a central test grating
[1] even when backward masking [2] of the surround
prevents its orientation from being consciously per-
ceived. The effect survives introduction of a gap be-
tween test and surround of over a degree even under
masking, suggesting either that contextual informa-
tion can effectively propagate across early visual cor-
tex in the absence of awareness of the signaled
context or that it can proceed undetected to higher
processing levels at which such horizontal propaga-
tion may not be necessary. The effect under masking
also shows partial interocular transfer, demonstrating
processing of orientation by binocular neurons in vi-
sual cortex in the absence of conscious orientation
perception. This pattern of results is consistent with
the suggestion that simultaneous orientation contrast
is mediated at multiple levels of the visual processing
hierarchy [3–6], and it supports the view that prop-
agation of signals to [7] and, possibly, back from
[8–10] higher visual areas is necessary for con-
scious perception.
Results and Discussion
Previous studies suggest that, in visual cortex, a level
of activity can be induced that is sufficient to generate
adaptation but insufficient to produce a conscious per-
cept [11–14]. Although this previous work can be
thought of as mapping out an operating characteristic
between neural activity (as gauged by adaptation) and
consciousness, it is not sufficient to rule out the exis-
tence of a single process underlying adaptation and
conscious perception. For example, our conscious per-
ception could monitor activity in a given region of cor-
tex as long as the rate of activity exceeded some base-
line amount, whereas the activity threshold necessary
to generate adaptation could be somewhat lower. Bin-
ocular rivalry has been used to demonstrate that in-
termittent suppression of an adapting stimulus does
not always reduce its efficacy, suggesting that suppres-
sion from awareness is occurring at a site in the pro-
cessing hierarchy after that mediating adaptation [15].
However, caution must be exercised in interpreting this
result, which could simply reflect saturation of adapta-
tion during the intermittent periods of stimulus domi-*Correspondence: colinc@psych.usyd.edu.aunance [16]. When binocular rivalry has been used to
suppress a simultaneous inducing stimulus, results
have been equivocal [17, 18].
Here, we demonstrate that the operating characteris-
tic between neural activity (as gauged by simultaneous
orientation contrast [1]) and conscious perception var-
ies as a function of the conditions of stimulus presenta-
tion. Specifically, we show that an oriented surround
grating affects the perceived orientation of a central
test grating even when backward masking of the sur-
round completely prevents its orientation from being
consciously perceived.
Perceptually, a vertical test grating appears repelled
in orientation from that of a 15° surround grating (Figure
1A). The magnitude of this simultaneous orientation
contrast for six subjects (two authors, C.C. and J.H.,
and four observers naive to the purposes of the study)
in unmasked and masked conditions is shown in Figure
1B. The mean (± standard error) magnitude of simulta-
neous contrast across subjects in the unmasked and
masked conditions was 3.50 ± 0.47 and 1.42 ± 0.37,
respectively. Although the magnitude of the effect in the
masked condition was significantly smaller than in the
unmasked condition (t5 = 3.48, p < 0.01), it was still
significantly greater than zero (t5 = 3.84, p < 0.01).
In separate experimental runs, we measured percep-
tion of the surround in the masked and unmasked con-
ditions. In the masked condition, with a randomly ori-
ented center stimulus, subjects consistently performed
at chance in a single-interval two-alternative forced-
choice judgment of the orientation of the surrounding
stimulus (Figure 1C). Performance at chance level in
this forced-choice task demonstrates that perceptual
processing of the orientation of the surround was not
merely subliminal, in the sense of being below some
arbitrary response criterion—it was strictly uncon-
scious. With a mask but a blank or horizontal center
stimulus, performance was still close to chance (Figure
1D), leading us to conclude that the principal limit on
perception is backward masking of the inducing stimu-
lus [2] rather than response competition between the
center and surround orientations [19]. Backward mask-
ing might operate either by interrupting processing of
the inducing stimulus [2] or by disrupting recurrent in-
teractions between higher and lower visual areas [8].
Primary visual cortex (V1) is the first stage of the vi-
sual processing hierarchy to contain cells selective for
stimulus orientation [20]. Thus, the neural substrate of
simultaneous orientation contrast must be cortical, in-
volving interactions between neurons at or beyond the
level of V1 [3]. It has been reported that the responses
of individual neurons in V1 of monkeys are not corre-
lated with perception in that they signal stereoscopic
disparity rather than perceived depth [21], chromatic
flicker beyond the perceptual resolution limit [22], and
eye blinks [23], and only a minority of neurons in pri-
mary visual cortex show activity correlated with per-
ception during binocular rivalry [24]. However, brain im-
aging studies of binocular rivalry in humans have found
that modulations of hemodynamic activity in V1 track
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575Figure 1. Simultaneous Orientation Contrast
(A) A surround grating oriented at or around
15° from the vertical causes an objectively
vertical central stimulus to appear tilted in
the opposite direction. In the actual experi-
ments the relative sizes of center and sur-
round were as illustrated, but the grating
spatial frequency was much higher, such
that the center contained 24 cycles of the
grating and the surround contained 120.
(B) Magnitude of simultaneous orientation
contrast for six subjects in unmasked and
masked conditions.
(C) Percentage correct identification of sur-
round orientation for the same six subjects
in the presence of a randomly oriented
central grating.
(D) Percentage correct identification of sur-
round orientation for three of the subjects
with randomly oriented, horizontal, and
blank central stimuli. Error bars in all figures
indicate plus and minus one standard error
of the mean.perception [25, 26], consistent with the notion that per-
ception monitors processing in early visual areas [27].
Recent studies from the first author’s laboratory have
used manipulations of stimulus color to demonstrate
that simultaneous orientation contrast is mediated by
processing at multiple levels of visual cortex [4–6]. Ori-
entation-specific interactions at the earliest, monocular
level are selective for stimulus color, whereas process-
ing at subsequent binocular levels is essentially cue in-
variant [6]. The net simultaneous orientation contrast
effect presumably reflects an aggregate of these in-
teractions across the various levels. If perception of ori-
entation also monitors neural activity across these
areas, then the effects of masking on orientation per-
ception and simultaneous orientation contrast should
be constrained by the operating characteristic relating
these two measures in the unmasked condition. Speci-
fically, the effect of masking on perception of the sur-
round and on the magnitude of simultaneous orienta-
tion contrast would be to reduce effective stimulus
strength without changing the operating characteristic
relating the two measures.
However, our results show that the effect of masking
upon perception of the orientation of the surround is
much greater than that predicted from its effect on the
magnitude of simultaneous orientation contrast (Figure
2). This indicates that activity in early visual cortical
areas may not contribute directly to the content of con-
scious perception. Instead, our results are consistent
with the suggestion that simultaneous contrast is medi-
ated at multiple levels of the visual processing hier-
archy [3–6]. Under masking, the generally observed
reduction in magnitude of simultaneous orientation
contrast suggests that a component of the unmasked
effect involves areas whose activity normally contrib-
utes to conscious perception of orientation. However,
the existence of a simultaneous orientation contrast ef-
fect even when masking renders the orientation of the
inducing grating invisible demonstrates the involve-ment of orientation processing mechanisms whose ac-
tivity is not consciously perceived.
We carried out two further experiments to compare
the effects of simultaneous contrast in masked and un-
masked conditions. First, a gap was introduced be-
tween the center and surround stimulus. The magni-
tude of simultaneous contrast was found to drop off in
a similar fashion in the two conditions (Figure 3). This
pattern of results confirms that the effect observed un-
der masking is qualitatively similar to the unmasked ef-
fect. Second, simultaneous orientation contrast was
measured under dichoptic presentation of test and in-
ducer followed by a binocular mask. Orientation con-
trast in the absence of awareness of the orientation of
the inducing stimulus was again observed (Figure 4).
Such interocular interactions implicate processing by
binocular neurons that are first found in V1, demon-
strating that certain network interactions in visual cor-
tex are not of themselves sufficient to support visual
awareness.
It has been reported that the contextual modulation
evident in the late (>100 ms) component of the re-
sponses of V1 neurons of awake monkeys is absent
when the stimuli are not consciously perceived [28].
Dissociation between neuronal modulation and behav-
ioral report is found only when the monkeys’ reward
regime encourages them to adopt a conservative re-
sponse criterion, consistent with the operation of a sim-
ple decision mechanism after initial sensory process-
ing. In contrast, we find that a criterion-independent
forced-choice procedure reveals marked contextual ef-
fects on the perceived orientation of a test stimulus in
the complete absence of awareness of the inducing ori-
entation. This is significant because it indicates that
spatial interactions specific to stimulus orientation, and
thus involving neural activity at a level as least as high
as V1, can proceed in the absence of awareness. Our
finding that the operating characteristic between neural
activity (as gauged by simultaneous orientation con-
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576Figure 2. Simultaneous Orientation Contrast
and Surround Identification at a Range of
Surround Contrasts
Each row depicts data from a single subject.
Center contrasts were 25% for subject J.H.,
50% for C.C., and 100% for C.M. Data from
unmasked (filled circles) and masked (un-
filled squares) conditions show the magni-
tude of simultaneous orientation contrast
(left column) and percentage correct identifi-
cation of surround orientation (middle col-
umn) as a function of surround contrast. The
right-hand column shows “operating charac-
teristics” for the two conditions obtained by
plotting surround identification performance
against measures of simultaneous orienta-
tion contrast from comparable conditions.What is the essential difference between the pro- ternatively, the difference could be essentially tempo-
Figure 3. The Effect on Simultaneous Orien-
tation Contrast of Introducing a Gap be-
tween Center and Surround Stimuli
Data from two subjects for unmasked (filled
circles) and masked (unfilled squares) condi-
tions show the magnitude of simultaneous
orientation contrast (left column) as a func-
tion of gap width. The right-hand column
shows for each condition the data normal-
ized to the value with no gap.trast) and conscious perception differs markedly be- c
atween masked and unmasked presentation conditions
cannot be accounted for by a thresholding mechanism c
soperating on the output of early sensory processing.
Instead, it demonstrates that the activity of at least m
wsome of the neural processes mediating simultaneous
orientation contrast is not accessible to conscious ori- t
pentation perception.esses underlying conscious orientation perception
nd the processes mediating simultaneous orientation
ontrast? The difference could be an anatomical one,
uch that processing in visual areas higher than those
ediating simultaneous orientation contrast under back-
ard masking is required for conscious vision [7]. In
his case, the effect of masking would be to disrupt
rocessing disproportionately in those higher areas. Al-
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577Figure 4. The Effect of Dichoptic Presenta-
tion on Simultaneous Orientation Contrast
Data from three subjects for unmasked (left
pairs of bars) and masked (right pairs of
bars) conditions show the magnitude of si-
multaneous orientation contrast for binocu-
lar (black bars) and dichoptic (white bars)
presentation. Figures below each pair of
bars denote magnitude of dichoptic effect as
a percentage of the corresponding binocu-
lar effect.ral, such that masking truncates processing of the in-
ducing stimulus. A temporal effect would be consistent
with the observation that only a late (>100 ms) compo-
nent of V1 activity correlates with perception [28]. Pre-
sentation of a mask 50 ms after stimulus onset could
then interfere selectively with this late response com-
ponent. These two alternatives are not mutually exclu-
sive. For example, the late component of the V1 re-
sponse might be the result of reentrant propagation of
signals from higher visual areas [8].
Interactive models of visual awareness propose that
consciousness is essentially a network property involv-
ing interactions between coalitions of neurons within or
across cortical regions [8–10]. It is possible that effects
of cortical adaptation in absence of awareness of the
adapting stimulus [11–15] are generated intrinsically
within the adapted neurons in the absence of interac-
tions at the cortical level. In this case, it would be wrong
to conclude that the adapted neurons are not an integ-
ral part of a fundamentally distributed neural correlate
of consciousness [16]. Our results demonstrate that
certain interactions within early cortical areas are not
of themselves sufficient to support awareness. Instead,
they are consistent with the view that propagation of
signals to, and possibly back from, higher visual areas
is necessary for conscious perception.
Experimental Procedures
Stimuli were generated with Matlab software to drive a VSG 2/5
graphics card (Cambridge Research Systems) and were displayed
on a γ-corrected 21” Sony Trinitron GM 520 monitor (1024 × 768
resolution; 120 Hz refresh rate). The background was a uniform
gray field with a luminance of 62.8 Cd/m2, and a central fixation
marker was present at all times.
The stimulus used to generate simultaneous orientation contrast
consisted of a circular patch of test grating (diameter: 3°) sur-
rounded by a concentric annulus (outer diameter: 15°) containing
an inducing grating oriented 15° clockwise or counterclockwise
from vertical. Both center and surround gratings had random spa-
tial phase. The magnitude of the simultaneous orientation contrast
effect was measured by instructing subjects to make a forced-
choice judgment of the perceived orientation of the center grating
(clockwise or counterclockwise from vertical) while varying its ori-
entation between trials. Trials containing clockwise and counter-
clockwise inducing gratings were randomly interleaved to avoid the
build up of adaptation to any one surround orientation across trials.
Interleaved adaptive psychophysical procedures [29] of 30 trials
each were used to obtain estimates of perceived subjective verticalfor the clockwise and counterclockwise surround orientations. The
magnitude of simultaneous orientation contrast was taken as half
the difference between the two points of subjective vertical.
Simultaneous orientation contrast was measured in two condi-
tions: masked and unmasked. Center and surround stimuli were 8
cycles per degree sine wave gratings modulated in luminance
around that of the background. They were ramped on and off to-
gether inside a temporal window of 50 ms total duration. In the
masked condition, stimulus presentation was followed immediately
by a random noise mask, covering the surround annulus but not
the center, that remained on the screen until the subject indicated
a response.
Subjects were required to make a forced-choice judgment of the
perceived orientation of the surround grating (clockwise or
counterclockwise from vertical) in separate experimental runs to
measure perception of the surround. The stimuli were identical to
those used to measure simultaneous orientation contrast, except
that the orientation of the center stimulus was randomly chosen
every trial from a distribution uniform over the full 180° range. Ran-
domization of the orientation of the center ensures that its per-
ceived orientation cannot provide a cue to the orientation of the
surround grating. For example, if the center stimulus is always ver-
tical, then any simultaneous orientation contrast would tend to
make it appear tilted away from the physical orientation of the sur-
round, so subjects would be able to infer the orientation of the
surround even when it was invisible.
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